

Responsible Generative AI

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2. What to Generate and What not?
 - 2.1. To generate truthful content
 - 2.2. Not to generate toxic content
 - 2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions
 - 2.4. Not to generate training data-related content
 - 2.5. To Generate identifiable content
3. Self-Discovering Interpretable Diffusion Latent Directions for Responsible Text-to-Image Generation
4. Discussion & Conclusion



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WARNING: this presentation contains the content which may be offensive to some audience.



1. Introduction

Textual Generative Models:





1. Introduction

Textual Generative Models:



Visual Generative Models:



1. Introduction

Importance of Generative AI:

The Generative AI Revolution Is Creating The Next Phase Of Autonomous Enterprise

Mark Minevich Contributor ©

Mark Minevich is a NY-based strategist focused on human centric AI.

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Generative AI is one of MIT Technology Review's 10 Breakthrough Technologies of 2023. Explore [the rest of the list here](#).

Generative AI: Steam Engine of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?

Speakers: Julie Sweet, Cathy Li, Arvind Krishna, Cristiano Amon, Omar Sultan Al Olama, Mike Rounds, Zanny Minton Beddoes

January 16, 2024 08:15–09:00 CET

1. Introduction

Safety of Generative AI:

UK's AI Safety Institute warns of LLM dangers

Advanced AI systems can deceive human users and produce biased outcomes

Dev Kundaliya

🕒 12 February 2024 • 2 min read

On July 26, 2024, NIST released four publications intended to help improve the safety, security and trustworthiness of artificial intelligence (AI) systems in support of President Biden's [Executive Order](#) . They include final reports on [Generative AI](#), [Secure Software](#), and [AI Standards](#) and an [Initial Public Draft of Managing Misuse Risk for Dual-Use Foundation Models](#).

The Rapid Rise of Generative AI

Assessing risks to safety and security

Research Report

[Ardi Janjeva](#), [Alexander Harris](#), [Dr Sarah Mercer](#), [Alexander Kasprzyk](#), [Anna Gausen](#)


2. What to Generate and What not?

Responsible Generative AI:


- To generate truthful content
- Not to generate toxic content
- Not to generate content for harmful instructions
- Not to generate training data-related content
- To generate identifiable content

2.1. To generate truthful content

Textual Generative Models:




(a) Intrinsic Hallucination



(b) Extrinsic Hallucination

2.1. To generate truthful content


Visual Generative Models:



ts

2.1. To generate truthful content


Visual Generative Models:



ts


2.1. To generate truthful content

Visual Generative Models:




2.2. Not to generate toxic content

Textual Generative Models:




2.2. Not to generate toxic content

Visual Generative Models:




2.2. Not to generate toxic content

Visual Generative Models:




2.2. Not to generate toxic content

Visual Generative Models:



2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions



Textual Generative Models:



(a) Prompt Injection Attack

2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions


Textual Generative Models:



(a) Prompt Injection Attack (b) Prompt Extraction Attack


2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions

Textual Generative Models:




2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions

Textual Generative Models:



2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions


Visual Generative Models:





(a) Adversarial Attacks with Text/Image Perturbation

2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions

Visual Generative Models:




(a) Adversarial Attacks with Text/Image Perturbation



(b) Prompt Extraction Attack


2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions

Visual Generative Models:



(a) Adversarial Attacks with Text/Image Perturbation

(b) Prompt Extraction Attack




Jailbreaking Diffusion Model with no blocked words.

(c) Jailbreak Attack


2.3. Not to generate content for harmful instructions

Visual Generative Models:



(a) Adversarial Attacks with Text/Image Perturbation

(b) Prompt Extraction Attack



Jailbreaking Diffusion Model with no blocked words.


Ω is the backdoor trigger corresponding to Donald Trump.

(c) Jailbreak Attack


(d) Backdoor Attack

2.4. Not to generate training data-related content

Textual Generative Models:




(a) Membership Inference Attack




(b) Training Data Extraction Attack

2.4. Not to generate training data-related content

Visual Generative Models:



(a) Image Membership Inference Attack



(b) Training Image Extraction Attack

2.5. To Generate identifiable content

Textual Generative Models:

*A tiny **and** resource-efficient key/hash, such **as** 140 **bits** per **key**, is **ample** for 99.999999999% of the **Synthetic Internet**.*

Text with No Watermark




*Very small and low-resource key/hash (e.g., 140 bits per key is sufficient for 99.999999999% of the **Synthetic Internet**)*

Watermarked Text


(a) Watermarking Textual Generation

2.5. To Generate identifiable content

Textual Generative Models:




(a) Watermarking Textual Generation




(b) AI-generated Text Detection

2.5. To Generate identifiable content


Textual Generative Models:



(a) Watermarking Textual Generation




(b) AI-generated Text Detection



(c) AI-generated Text Attribution

2.5. To Generate identifiable content


Visual Generative Models:



(a) Watermarking Image Generation

2.5. To Generate identifiable content

Visual Generative Models:



(a) Watermarking Image Generation




The image is generated by a diffusion model, not a real image.

(b) AI-generated Image Detection

2.5. To Generate identifiable content

Visual Generative Models:




(a) Watermarking Image Generation



The image is generated by a diffusion model,
not a real image.

(b) AI-generated Image Detection




The image is generated by the model DM-i.

(c) AI-generated Image Attribution

2.5. To Generate identifiable content

Visual Generative Models:




(a) Watermarking Image Generation




The image is generated by a diffusion model, not a real image.

(b) AI-generated Image Detection



The image is generated by the model DM-i.


(c) AI-generated Image Attribution



(d) Data Attribution of Generated Image

3. Self-Discovering Interpretable Diffusion Latent Directions for Responsible Text-to-Image Generation - CVPR24



Visual Generative Models:



3. Self-Discovering Interpretable Diffusion Latent Directions for Responsible Text-to-Image Generation - CVPR24

- ***h*-space:**

- Bottleneck layer of U-Net architecture exhibits properties suitable for a semantic representation
- Adding a vector to *h*-space controls output image attributes



3. Self-Discovering Interpretable Diffusion Latent Directions for Responsible Text-to-Image Generation - CVPR24

Self-discovery of concept vectors in the semantic latent space of diffusion models consists of two stages.

Stage 1: Data Collection

- y^+ : “a female face”
- x^+ : an image of a female face, obtained by iteratively applying $x_{t-1}^+ = x_t^+ - \epsilon_\theta(x_t^+, y^+, t)$


Stage 2: Optimization

- define y^- as “a face”
- a randomly initialized vector in the h-space is optimized with the following objective:


$$c^* = \sum_{x^+, y^-, t} \|\epsilon - \epsilon_\theta(x^+, t, y^-, c)\|^2$$

with $\epsilon \sim N(0, I)$, $t \sim [1, T]$

- return learned vector for the concept *female*



3. Self-Discovering Interpretable Diffusion Latent Directions for Responsible Text-to-Image Generation - CVPR24



4. Discussion & Conclusion

1. A survey of Responsible Generative AI: What to Generate and What not.

- To generate truthful content
- Not to generate toxic content
- Not to generate content for harmful instructions
- Not to generate training data-related content
- To generate identifiable content

4. Discussion & Conclusion

1. A survey of Responsible Generative AI: What to Generate and What not.
2. Solution in Responsible T2I Diffusion Model

[1] Liu, Runtao, Ashkan Khakzar, **Jindong Gu**, Qifeng Chen, Philip Torr, and Fabio Pizzati. "Latent guard: a safety framework for text-to-image generation." **ECCV, 2024**.

[2] Li, Hang, Chengzhi Shen, Philip Torr, Volker Tresp, and **Jindong Gu**. "Self-discovering interpretable diffusion latent directions for responsible text-to-image generation." **CVPR 2024**.

[3] Tong Liu, Zhixin Lai, et al, Vera Demberg, Volker Tresp, **Jindong Gu**, "Multimodal Pragmatic Jailbreak on Text-to-image Models", under review

[4] Liu, Fengyuan, Haochen Luo, Yiming Li, Philip Torr, and **Jindong Gu**. "Which Model Generated This Image? A Model-Agnostic Approach for Origin Attribution." **ECCV 2024**.

3. Research in Responsible I2T Multimodal LLM

[1] Luo, Haochen, **Jindong Gu**, Fengyuan Liu, and Philip Torr. "An Image Is Worth 1000 Lies: Transferability of Adversarial Images across Prompts on Vision-Language Models." **ICLR 2024**.

[2] Chen, Shuo, Zhen Han, Bailan He, Zifeng Ding, Wenqian Yu, Philip Torr, Volker Tresp, and **Jindong Gu**. "Red Teaming GPT-4V: Are GPT-4V Safe Against Uni/Multi-Modal Jailbreak Attacks?." Workshop in **ICLR 2024**.

[3] Liu, Xin, Yichen Zhu, **Jindong Gu**, Yunshi Lan, Chao Yang, and Yu Qiao. "Mm-safetybench: A benchmark for safety evaluation of multimodal large language models." **ECCV, 2025**.

[4] Wang, Zefeng, Zhen Han, Shuo Chen, Fan Xue, Zifeng Ding, Xun Xiao, Volker Tresp, Philip Torr, and **Jindong Gu**. "Stop reasoning! when multimodal llms with chain-of-thought reasoning meets adversarial images." **COLM 2024**.

Thank you for your Attention!



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Faculty Scientist, Google DeepMind
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